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The importance of group-fit in new director selection 
Purpose: Director selection is an important yet under-researched topic. This paper aims to 
contribute to extant literature by gaining a greater understanding into how and why are new board 
members are recruited.  
Design/methodology/approach: This exploratory study uses in-depth interviews with Australian 
non-executive directors to identify what selection criteria are deemed most important when 
selecting new director candidates and how selection practices vary between organisations. 
Findings: Our findings indicate that appointments to the board are based on two key attributes: (1) 
the candidates’ ability to contribute complementary skills and (2) the candidates’ ability to work well 
with the existing board. Despite commonality in these broad criteria, board selection approaches 
vary considerably between organisations. As a result, some boards do not adequately assess both 
criteria when appointing a new director hence increasing the chance of a mis-fit between the 
position and the appointed director. 
Research implications: Our study highlights the importance of both individual technical capabilities 
and social compatibility in director selections. We introduce a new perspective through which future 
research may consider director selection: fit.  
Originality/value: Our in-depth analysis of director selection processes highlights some less obvious 
and more nuanced issues surrounding directors’ appointment to the board. Recurrent patterns 
indicate the need for both technical and social considerations. Hence our study is a first-step in 
synthesising the current literature and illustrates the need for a multi-theoretical approach in future 
director selection research. 
Keywords: Boards of directors, director selection, board composition, board effectiveness 
Article Classification: Research paper 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Perhaps often, and certainly occasionally, men cannot be promoted or selected or even must be 
relieved because they cannot function, because they ‘do not fit’, where there is no question of formal 
competence” [Barnard, 1938:224]. 
Barnard’s candid reflection on executives in 1938 supports a long recognised notion within the 
management teams’ literature; pursuing group-fit during member selection is important to ensuring 
group functioning. Group-fit, derived from an interpersonal compatibility between individuals and 
their work group (Kristof-Brown, 1996), facilitates cohesion and trust through value congruence and 
attraction (Seong et al., 2012). It is generally recognised that group performance improves with 
higher levels of cohesiveness (Evans & Dion, 2012). Like other teams, boards of directors are 
interdependent groups of people whose ability to communicate and coordinate is critical to task 
performance. In fact, the cognitive nature of their tasks combined with unique operating 
circumstances (meeting infrequently, for short amounts of time and being comprised mostly of 
outsiders) means boards are particularly vulnerable to interpersonal difficulties (Forbes & Milliken, 
1990).  It is surprising therefore that the notion of group-fit is largely absent from discussions on 
how boards should be composed.  
The frequency and impact of corporate failures over the past two decades has resulted in an 
increased level of interest around corporate governance and boards of directors. In particular, the 
issue of board structure has attracted debate from both regulators and researchers who have drawn 
their attention to the question of how should a board be composed to best add value? In an attempt 
to ensure investor protection, regulators have revisited corporate governance codes, advocating 
greater board independence along with individual directors to have a higher degree of skills and 
qualifications. Similarly a number of scholars have considered how independence and various forms 
of human capital can add value to a board (Haynes & Hillman, 2010; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). What 
is often absent from this conversation is the recognition that boards are groups (Bainbridge, 2002), 
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whose members need to interact and work together as a team (Bezemer, Nicholson & Pugliese, 
2014; Forbes & Milliken, 1999).  
While studies into board composition are abundant (Johnson, Schnatterly & Hill, 2012), there is 
limited literature on the basis of director selection. Consequently, while we know much of who sits 
on boards we know relatively little of the processes driving their selection. Since the appointment of 
a new director is likely to affect board performance, this area deserves greater examination.  
The purpose of our study is to address two gaps in the current literature. Firstly, what criteria are 
considered important by current directors when selecting new director candidates, and secondly how 
do director selections vary. The exploratory nature of our research questions and nascent state of 
the literature led us to an inductive qualitative research design (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). Our 
findings, drawn from in-depth interviews with current Australian non-executive directors unveil key 
aspects of the director selection process, with implications for both theory and practice. We find 
that while there is considerable variability in how boards identify and select candidates, in general 
boards seek out candidates based on two overarching criteria: (1) those who fit the role and (2) who 
fit the group. While the criterion of group-fit is unsurprising, this is an area that has received little 
attention in the corporate governance literature. We further examine the processes by which boards 
assess (or fail to assess) candidates for both forms of fit and suggest that the type of selection 
process adopted by a board can impact the likelihood of appointing a director with the right fit. 
Our paper is structured as follows: First, we present the rationale for this study and our research 
questions in the context of the current literature into director selection. This is followed by a 
discussion of our research method and an outline of our initial findings. The inductive nature of our 
study leads us back to the literature and data using an iterative process to investigate how director 
‘fit’ is affected by the selection process. Thereafter we reflect on our overall findings and present 
propositions for use in future research. Finally, we discuss how our findings expand the current 
director selection literature and explain why focusing on the two dimensions of director-fit may 
provide more robust findings in future research compared with a single theoretical lens.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
Corporate governance research has typically considered director selection through either a rational 
economic or a socialised theoretical lens (Withers et al., 2012). The rational perspective assumes a 
formal and staged process of selection is used to appoint the individual judged most able to execute 
the role of a director and thereby positively influence governance (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Regulators 
promote this perspective by emphasising individual directors’ independence and skills as critical 
components of board structure. In contrast, the socialised stream of research suggests that director 
selection is only marginally influenced by the search for a role-fit but is rather a part of the rituals of 
a managerial elite to whom directors belong (Davis, 2005).  
Combined these two perspectives create an obvious tension between the desire to appoint a 
director with the capacity to govern well and the desire to appoint someone whom the selectors 
know and trust. In practice it is likely that director selections are driven both by economic and social 
factors, but this reality is generally not well recognised within the current literature (Withers et al., 
2012). 
Director selection criteria 
The rational economic perspective emphasises the role requirements of a director. Agency theory 
suggests that candidates should be selected based on their ability to monitor management – hence 
their independence is paramount (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In doing so, the board adds value to the 
corporation by reducing the costs associated with the separation of ownership from control (Walsh 
& Seward, 1990). Alternatively, resource dependence theorists suggest directors are selected based 
on how well their occupational and functional experience fit the needs of the organisation (e.g. 
Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold, 2000; Pfeffer, 1972). To complicate the selection decision, board 
knowledge requirements are dynamic, changing in response to internal and external factors (Hillman 
& Dalziel, 2003; Nicholson & Kiel, 2004). For instance, organisational performance, strategy and life 
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cycle stages have all been considered to impact the capabilities a board seeks when recruiting new 
directors (Hillman et al., 2000). 
In contrast to the economic perspective, the socialised stream of research is less concerned with 
individual skills and capabilities as selection criteria and instead focuses on how social and political 
forces motivate appointments. Within this stream of research the balance of power between the 
CEO and board of directors plays an important role in why new directors are selected. For example, 
scholars have found that powerful CEO’s use their influence over the selection process to build 
alliances by appointing like-minded individuals and directors known for passive monitoring (Alderfer, 
1986; Bebchuk, 2004; Mace, 1971; Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Zajac & Westphal, 1996). Increasing 
evidence also shows that a director’s reputation for conformity can act as a predictor for gaining 
multiple appointments on other boards (Ahn, Jiraporn & Kim, 2010; Cashman, Gillan & Jun, 2012). 
On the other hand when there is a relatively powerful board of directors, for example when a board 
is dominated by outsiders and the role of CEO and chair is split, new directors are more likely to be 
demographically similar to the incumbent board (Westphal & Zajac, 1995) resulting in a more 
cohesive board better able to challenge the CEO’s influence (Alderfer, 1986).  
Status and prestige have also been found to increase a candidate’s attractiveness in director 
selections. Studies have found boards are more likely to appoint prestigious individuals or those with 
prestigious connections to reduce uncertainty and signal legitimacy to investors (Acharya & Pollock, 
2013; Certo, 2003; Davis, Yoo & Baker, 2003).  
We have described two perspectives from the current literature on director selection criteria. The 
first assumes directors are selected based on their individual skills and capabilities, while the second 
suggests selections are the result of social and political influences. In reality both are likely 
determinants of selection but few studies have combined these perspectives to consider the relative 
importance of role-fit versus other social influences. Further, the fact that the board is a group and 
needs to work well together to succeed is a factor given little attention by either perspective. Our 
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study aims to advance our knowledge of director selection by gaining a greater understanding of 
what really matters when boards recruit new members. As such our first research question is: 
RQ1: What criteria are considered important by current directors when assessing new director 
candidates? 
Processes and practices in new director appointments 
The rational stream of research into director selection assumes a four-stage director selection 
process: identification, screening, selection and appointment (Withers et al. 2012). This broad 
approach is reflective of regulatory guidelines that emphasise the need for a formal, rigorous and 
transparent process. However, research suggests there is no uniform process for identifying and 
evaluating candidates (Alderfer, 1986; O’Neal & Thomas, 1995). Scholars have noted variations exist 
in director selection approaches (Huse, 2007; Moodie, 2001) and many boards lack an effective 
process for selecting new members (Nadler, 2004). This literature suggests director selection is not 
solely a rational process and scope exists for selector biases to influence the decision. 
For decades scholars have noted the influence powerful CEO’s have on the director selection 
process. Recent governance reforms recommend boards appoint a nomination committee made up 
of independent directors to reduce a CEO’s direct influence over the nomination process (for 
example, principal 2.1 in the ASX corporate governance guidelines). Nevertheless, the extent of a 
CEO’s power both inside and outside an organisation can influence the willingness of independent 
directors to support the CEO’s wishes when it comes to board appointments (Bebchuk, 2004; 
Sauerwald, Lin & Peng, 2014). More subtle social mechanisms found to impact the selection decision 
include a directors ingratiatory behaviour (Westphal & Stern; 2006, 2007) and the widespread use of 
the ‘old boy’s network’ (e.g. Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Van den Berghe & Levrau, 2004). 
While recent increases in regulatory oversight and shareholder activism have created expectations 
for a more rigorous recruitment process (Huse, 2007; Monk & Minow, 2011), it is unlikely personal 
biases have been eliminated (Bebchuk, 2004). Furthermore, given the varied contexts under which 
organisations and boards operate, it is likely that selection processes differ. The intent of our second 
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research question is to gain a better understanding of how director selection practices vary across 
boards.   
RQ2: Do director selection processes vary, and if so, how?  
METHODS 
Our study relies on in-depth interviews with 10 directors involving 24 appointment events to explore 
what selection criteria is considered  important as well as how selection practices vary across 
boards. The vast majority of studies into board composition have relied on survey and archival data-
gathering techniques (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004). While their findings tell us the demographic 
characteristics of appointed directors such as age, education, background and gender (Johnson et 
al., 2012), they fail to explain whether these attributes are the reason for that individual’s selection 
or whether other social and political influences play a contributing role. Nor do they inform us of the 
approaches used to search and select for directors. That is, while a large database study can 
highlight the number of ex-CEOs appointed to boards, they provide less explanation as to whether 
being an ex-CEO is a significant factor in selection decisions or if less quantifiable factors influenced 
their appointments. In-depth interviews were chosen because of their ability to capture the 
perceptions and experiences of participants (Marshall & Rossman, 2011). By drawing from the first-
hand experiences of individuals who have participated in a director selection process we are better 
able to explore and describe the selection process in a way that would not be possible using other 
methods. 
Data collection 
Given the contingent nature of board composition outlined in the literature, it is likely that director 
selection practices vary according to firm size, ownership and levels of accountability. For example, 
publicly-listed corporations are large organisations owned by a vast range of public shareholders and 
subject to disclosure obligations under the Australian Corporations Act (2001). In contrast non-profit 
organisations vary from very small to large and are accountable to their members, while government 
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organisations face a high level of public accountability through various levels of government and 
public bodies. Our sample was purposefully selected to include representatives from each of these 
organisational sectors, and a variety of industries to allow greater insight into how selection 
practices and criteria may vary across different organisational settings. To date there have been 
limited empirical comparisons of this kind (Machold & Farquhar, 2013). 
Sociological research emphasises homogeneity on boards, and a perception of boards as ‘male, and 
stale’. A second objective of our selection strategy was to ensure we found participants outside this 
typical range. To achieve this, our sample included participants from both genders and a range of 
functional backgrounds and age groups. 
Initially five directors were recruited on the basis of their experience in a director selection process; 
all agreed to participate. Next, we employed a snowballing technique whereby each interviewee was 
asked for an introduction to other individuals who met the sample criteria; again all directors agreed 
to participate. The final sample includes 10 individuals serving 20 organisations across the publicly-
listed, government and non-profit sectors. Eight participants recounted more than one selection 
experience. In total 24 processes were recounted during the interviews and the data from these 24 
selections formed the basis of the data analysis.  
Insert here: Table 1: Profile of Participants 
Data Analysis 
The data analysis followed an iterative process of constant comparison between the data and theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Gioia, 1991; Suddaby, 2006). This process involved taking the data apart and then 
reassembling it to draw meaning and address the research questions. The data set comprised 7.45 
hours of recorded interviews and 65,236 words of transcripts that were subsequently coded into 182 
relevant segments of data. 
Data coding was performed at three levels – open, axial and selective. Initially, codes were 
developed around the director selection process. These were structural and not content specific but 
provided an important framework that allowed the data to be broken into manageable sized pieces 
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and provided a logical framework from which a second layer of open codes were inductively 
developed.  This initial process of assigning and revising codes resulted in a final set of 26 different 
codes. Axial coding was undertaken to reassemble the data fractured during the open coding 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This stage of analysis involved interconnecting codes and providing 
abstract names that were more reflective of the essence of the data. Categories were further refined 
using a process of selective coding. Categories with commonalities were consolidated while single 
incidents or categories with minimal evidence were deemed irrelevant. As themes developed it 
became clear when theoretical saturation was reached. Once no new insights were revealed it was 
felt the information had been exhausted and that the coding process had ended (Charmaz, 2006). 
The final phase of data analysis involved aggregating the codes and categories into overarching 
themes that reflected the core themes of the study providing the foundations for the study’s 
findings and conclusions. The final data structure map and process through which the main themes 
and findings emerged are highlighted in figure 1. 
Insert here: Figure 1: Data structure maps  
FINDINGS 
Commonality in selection criteria 
Our first research question considers director selection criteria. When asked about the criteria used 
to select individuals for board appointments, participants signalled three distinct types of attributes. 
Firstly, participants reported candidates should have an existing knowledge of how boards operate. 
Second, candidates should possess role-fit – they need to be able to contribute skills and experience 
complementary to those possessed by current directors. And finally, candidates should be a good 
group-fit – they should be socially compatible with the existing directors.  
Board know-how 
Half of the participants reported a pre-existing knowledge of how boards operate and what directors 
do is a hurdle or baseline that candidates must possess before being considered further. In 
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particular, it was stressed that would-be directors should know the difference between, “what’s the 
role of the board and what’s the role of management” (D8). While participants acknowledged many 
candidates do know how boards operate, one expressed frustration at the number of candidates 
looking to fill board seats that didn’t know what boards do; “lots of people want to be a director but 
they don’t really understand what it means” (D3). 
Role-fit 
In addition to knowing how boards operate, most of the participants reported candidate skills and 
experience were an important consideration. To determine whether there is a role-fit, the skill 
profile of a candidate is considered against the needs of the incumbent board; “We had a number of 
[incumbent directors] retiring, one was an engineer; one was a finance guy with extensive derivatives 
experience which is important for (us) and we were also looking for a Chair of our audit committee. 
So there were specific technical qualifications that we were looking for; an engineer, someone with 
derivatives experience; someone who could chair an audit committee” (D4). 
The role-fit of candidates is also considered in terms of what’s required to fill a recognised gap; 
“We’re doing billion dollar projects and we don’t have someone who knows the right questions to 
ask" (D6). 
Thus the skills and experience of a candidate are considered not in isolation, but expected to be 
complementary to the profile of the board. Further, the skill set of the board is not a static list of 
‘must have skills’. Instead competency requirements are dynamic, changing with organisational 
strategic changes; “We were looking for people with [listed company] experience either as an 
executive or as a director because at some point in the future [we] were going to be sold in some 
form and needed to have a board that could go through that process” (D4) 
As well as changing external forces; “The discussion has been around what sort of skill sets will we 
need going into the future and given that in [our industry] there’s a lot of national focus on a 
different regulatory framework we’ll need to import some other skill sets and we need to involve the 
governments” (D7). 
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Group-fit 
While skills, knowledge and experience feature as primary criteria for selecting new directors, 
participants suggested a further necessary requirement; “It’s about the right personalities and the 
right capacity to be a member of a group” (D9).  
Most participants raised the importance of ‘group-fit’ as a selection criteria, its significance reflected 
by the strong emphasis used in describing why individuals are selected; “The ultimate criteria was, 
will they fit in? … It’s the most important thing” (D8). 
Further, the group-fit criteria was perceived at least of equal important to that of the candidates’ 
skills and experience; “You’ve got to have the right experience and the right personal fit”; “There was 
very specific skills and personality (requirements) … it was an equal combination” (D5). 
We further probed interviewees on what they meant as group-fit: participants defined it as,  
“common ground” (D6), the ability to find a “connection” (D9) and “discuss the chunky things”(D6). 
Group-fit is seen as a necessary ingredient for a harmonious working environment, the need for 
which is stressed by one director in reference to the unique operating environment boards face; 
“You’re only meeting two hours every month so you’re looking for a synergy where you can just get 
on and do things … If there’s too much of a bridge to build it will slow progress.” (D3) 
While another explained how the value congruence that stems from group-fit is critical to effective 
decision making; “It’s about their values and what they stand for…When times get tough in the 
boardroom that’s what is going to come out and that’s what is going to be their goal post for 
decision making” (D6). 
Table 2 summarises the three selection criteria and highlights the need for candidates to possess a 
balance of both role-fit and group-fit. That is, role-fit and group-fit are considered complementary 
rather than competing criteria and an ideal candidate should possess both. Furthermore these two 
criteria are recognised as dynamic and dependent on the incumbent group formation. This suggests 
consideration of the board, as a group, is important for successful board appointments.  
Insert here Table 2: Summary of selection criteria 
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Variability in selection process 
The second research question considers how selection practices vary. As expected there was 
significant variability in the recruitment practices of boards. Of the 24 selections described for this 
study, 15 followed a similar rigorous and formal process, while the remaining nine were ad hoc, 
informal and at times heavily influenced by a single decision maker. Two significant dimensions in 
variation emerged from the data; firstly the source for identifying board candidates and second, the 
level of involvement by the incumbent board in the selection decision. Table 3 summarises the 
described selection processes and noted variances. 
Insert here Table 3: Summary of board processes reviewed 
Source of candidates 
The strongest variation in directors’ selection approach was in relation to the source for identifying 
suitable candidates: an open or closed network. We use the term ‘open network’ to describe a broad 
search pool that may include external advertising and external recruitment consultants while the 
term ‘closed network’ refers to a search pool relying solely on candidates known to the Chair, CEO or 
incumbent board members. 
Level of board involvement  
In addition to variation in the source of candidates, participants indicated a wide variation in the 
level of involvement by the incumbent board in the selection decision. Of the 24 described 
selections, 14 included a nomination committee or involvement by the wider board in the selection 
process, six appointments were made solely by a single decision maker (most often the Chair) while 
in four cases the appointments were made without any involvement of the board, including the 
Chair. 
Relationship between selection approach and selection outcome 
The variability in director selection approach described above gave rise to an important additional 
question: how does the selection process impact the selection outcome? This question prompted a 
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second iteration of data analysis to understand how different approaches to director selection 
impact the board’s ability to assess candidates for both role-fit and group-fit. Insights drawn from 
the human resource literature and from participant experiences under each approach enabled us to 
propose relationships between the selection process and the likely candidate fit. These propositions 
are described below and illustrated in figure 2.  
Candidate ‘fit’ is a multi-dimensional construct (Kristof-Brown, 2000) and while group-fit relies on 
subjective assessment, role-fit requires a more objective consideration of a candidate’s individual 
skill and experience (Edwards & Shipp, 2007). This implies decisions are best made using multiple 
steps that separate out role-fit and group-fit (Judge & Ferris, 1992; Kristof-Brown, 1996). 
Preconceived views of candidates have strong effects on overall evaluations even when later 
information disconfirms these initial opinions (Cable & Gilovich, 1998). For boards recruiting known 
candidates from closed networks, these biases may affect the overall evaluation, while open 
networks are likely better able to provide an objective assessment of role-fit.  
Research has also shown decision makers use their own value system as a benchmark for assessing 
candidates’ overall fit and that candidates selected are most likely to reflect the values of the 
decision maker (Judge & Ferris, 1992). This suggests that where a single person dominates the 
selection process there is a greater risk that the appointment will not meet the groups requirements 
whereas selection decisions involving the wider board are more likely to achieve group-fit 
(Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Huse, 2007). 
Source of candidates and role-fit relationship 
External influences such as shareholder demands and regulators are pushing boards to adopt more 
transparent and open search practices. Participants acknowledged the economic benefits of open 
sources recognising they enable better access to the skills and experience needed; “We decided we 
needed this and that, we hired a search firm and we ended up with [name of director]” (D6). 
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In contrast, when boards rely solely on closed networks it was acknowledged the result may not 
always be beneficial; “[by relying on acquaintances only] you get a completely mixed bag of skills … 
it’s not good governance” (D5). These findings lead to our first proposition: 
Proposition 1: The more open the network for candidates, the higher the likelihood of candidate role-
fit. 
Board involvement and group-fit relationship 
Despite variances in board involvement, there was a clear preference for high levels of board 
involvement. Participants recognised a direct relationship between board involvement and the 
ability to assess candidates for group-fit, explaining the process for one board; “Each of us met this 
person one on one to gauge style, [we were able to] test for style and culture, how will I work with 
this person?” (D6) 
The importance of being able to assess candidates for group-fit was obvious from repeated 
comments such as; “Until you sit down with someone and see if there’s a connection, do you respect 
that person, you don’t really know” (D4). 
Given the apparent importance placed on meeting candidates prior to selection it is not surprising 
participants were critical of appointments made without board involvement; “The new directors’ 
start next month and the chairman and myself don’t even know these people. We weren’t consulted” 
(D10).  
These insights lead to our second proposition: 
Proposition 2: The higher the board involvement in the selection process, the higher the likelihood of 
candidate group-fit. 
Insert here Figure 2: Proposed relationship between selection approach and candidate fit 
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DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Despite its relevance, director selection has been subject to limited investigation. While director 
selection is crucial in ensuring boards are equipped to perform their tasks, extant literature is under 
developed on the issues surrounding how boards appoint their directors. Furthermore, normative 
views and the regulation emphasize the need to identify the ‘right’ directors’ based on 
characteristics such as independence, skill-set and connections. While recommendations and 
expectations are straightforward, it is less clear how boards approach director selection and what 
processes and mechanisms drive the selection activities. Our study relied on in-depth interviews 
with non-executive directors whose involvement in numerous recruitment processes offers a more 
nuanced and richer understanding of the current practices.  
Our findings on selection criteria were notably consistent across different organisational contexts. 
Regardless of sector or size, directors seek out candidates who understand how boards operate, 
who’s skills and experience fit the role requirements (role-fit) and who are perceived compatible to 
the incumbent board members (group-fit). While board knowledge is considered a selection hurdle, 
role-fit and group-fit are both critical and considered with equal importance. Since these two criteria 
are dynamic, getting the right ‘fit’ is dependent on the incumbent board configuration. Thus 
recognising the board as a group is essential; a failure to consider collective capabilities and member 
personalities may result in the selection of an inappropriate candidate. 
Next to an overall consistency in terms of what is required and expected of newly appointed 
directors, our findings also indicate a certain degree of variation in terms of the processes adopted 
to identify and select new directors. We suggest not all approaches are able to adequately assess 
candidates for both role-fit and group-fit. In figure 2 we propose an effective appointment is most 
likely when boards use open network sources (to identify candidates who best fit the role 
requirements) and engage a high level of board involvement in the selection decision (to ensure the 
successful candidate will fit the group).        
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Whereas role-fit contributes to board performance by filling a gap in needed skills, group-fit enables 
an incoming director to utilise those skills for the groups’ benefit. The emphasis on individual-level 
attributes and incentives has attracted researchers and regulators’ attention around director-level 
characteristics; our results resonate with calls for additional exploration of the board as a distinct 
unit of analysis, above and beyond the individuals who comprise it (Dalton & Dalton, 2011). The 
group-based nature of the board means that where group-fit is absent, there is an increased risk of a 
group misfit leading to process losses as incumbent members withdraw or disengage (Steiner, 1972). 
For instance, our evidence indicates the ability to “discuss the chunky things” (D6) is important; 
particularly so for a group that meets for short periods of time on a sporadic basis (Finkelstein & 
Mooney, 2003). Thus group-fit is critical to the application of directors’ role-fit.  
On the other hand, too much cohesion can also limit effectiveness as pressures for consensus 
override the motivation to appraise alternative options (Janis, 1972). For boards this condition of 
group-think is most likely to occur when candidates are selected on group-fit alone without 
consideration for the diverse skills and experience needed to fill the role requirements. We suggest a 
selection approach that considers both role-fit and group-fit will result in the most effective 
appointment. This is illustrated in figure 3, which highlights potential consequences of not assessing 
candidates for both role-fit and group-fit.  
Insert here Figure 3: Selection outcome based on selection focus 
Our paper makes theoretical contributions to corporate governance research on director selection 
and board composition. To date director selection in the literature has been considered 
predominately through a single theoretical lens. Scholars have either assumed director selection to 
be a rational process driven by economic motivations or they have focused on selector biases 
embedded within the process. Furthermore, few have considered the group based needs of the 
board. Our study goes some way toward advancing our knowledge of director selection by 
introducing a new lens through which future research may consider director selection; fit. Consistent 
with the team literature our concept of fit emerged as multi-dimensional encompassing both role-fit 
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and group-fit. Our findings complement the existing literature by integrating economic and social 
perspectives to provide a more realistic view of director selection and the keys to director success. 
For example in figure 3 we suggest an effective appointment requires high levels of candidate role-fit 
and group-fit, where role-fit reflects the boards economic needs and group-fit acknowledges the 
boards social needs. It is only by having an appropriate group-fit that the equally necessary role-fit of 
a director can be harnessed.  
Our review of the literature shows that while numerous scholars have recognised the need to assess 
role-fit in director selections less research has considered the social needs of the board in terms of 
candidate group-fit. Our study points to group-fit as a major determinant in director selections 
suggesting this factor has been underrepresented in governance literature. While many researchers 
have noted the need for cohesiveness on boards (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Kemp, 2006; Sonnenfeld, 
2002), there have been few empirical studies examining the dynamics of the boardroom (Hambrick, 
Werder & Zajac, 2008; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Petrovic, 2008).  
Future studies of boards of directors would therefore benefit from incorporating board dynamics 
into their research and paying greater attention to how group-fit can impact on board effectiveness 
as well as understanding what factors contribute to or detract from group-fit within a board context. 
For example, what impact does diversity or the mix of insiders to outsiders have on board dynamics? 
Related to this, a further worthwhile area for study would be in examining why directors leave 
boards. An understanding of the conditions and influences that prompt a director to exit a board can 
provide a counter perspective to the factors raised in this study and further our understanding of 
how board dynamics may impact board performance. 
Our study has some limitations that deserve to be noted. Firstly the findings from this study are 
based on in-depth interviews. While this was appropriate for the objectives of this study, there are 
implicit limitations due to the subjective nature of this research method. For example the findings 
are based on the experiences and perceptions of the participants rather than what actually occurred 
and are therefore subject to recall bias. Second, this study has been set within a context of 
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Australian organisations and based on a sample of non-executive directors. As such and its 
transferability may be limited to countries that share a similar cultural and corporate governance 
environment.  
Director selection is an emerging area of research within the governance literature and much 
remains to be uncovered about director appointments. Future research can enhance the reliability 
of our findings by testing our propositions using more direct methods of data collection such as 
surveys. Future research may also improve on the generalisability of our propositions by using a 
sample set of organisations that operate under alternative governance environments and may 
benefit from extending the sample to include executive directors and CEOs.  
The data availability did not allow us to explore the effects of different selection processes over a 
longer period of time, nor did it enable us to study changes in recruitment practices as a result of 
previously successful (or unsuccessful) appointments. Future studies employing a longitudinal design 
will certainly be better able to explore whether firms adjust according to past experiences and 
consider other critical questions such as; how long does it take for new members to integrate socially 
with the incumbent board and how does this transition impact on their capacity to contribute 
effectively to board decisions?  
Our research also has important implications for practitioners and governance regulators. Australian 
corporate governance guidelines for board structure recommend selection procedures that include 
an open and transparent search for candidates who meet the needs of the board as well as 
advocating involvement by all board members in the selection decision (ASX Corporate Governance 
Council, 2014). Practitioners, regulators and owners would do well to concentrate on all aspects of 
this advice and not become overly focused on one single aspect. For instance, the evidence from 
participants in our study suggests an emphasis on transparency and openness in the search for 
directors on government boards can prove counterproductive if it excludes the incumbent board 
from the selection decision.  
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CONCLUSION  
Director selection is crucial in ensuring boards are well-equipped to perform their tasks. It is during 
the director recruitment process that prospective new members are assessed for their ability to 
contribute needed technical skills; a role-fit. It should also be an opportunity to assess candidates for 
perceived compatibility; a group-fit. In order to increase board effectiveness, Finkelstein and 
Mooney encouraged boards to “get to know and understand the other people on the board, to 
develop chemistry” (2003: 110). The logical place to begin developing this chemistry is at the 
selection stage. By casting a broad search net for candidates and involving the entire board in the 
selection decision, boards are best able to appoint a candidate who is not only equipped with the 
right technical skills but can also function well within the board environment to ensure that their 
skills are used to make an effective contribution. 
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Table 1: Profile of participants 
 
 
Ref: 
Sector Position Gender Age 
group 
Current 
board 
seats 
Processes 
described 
 
Non-profit Public 
Listed 
Government 
D1 X   Chair Male 41 – 50 1 2 
D2 X   Chair Male 51 + 1 1 
D3 X   Chair Male 30 - 40 1 2 
D4 X  X Non-executive Female 41 – 50 3 4 
D5  X X Non-executive Female 30 – 40 3 4 
D6  X  Non-executive Female 41 – 50 3 3 
D7 X   Chair Female 41 – 50 2 3 
D8 X  X Chair Male 51 + 2 1 
D9 X   Chair Female 41 – 50 1 1 
D10   X Non-executive Female 51 + 
 
3 
20 
3 
24 
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Table 2: Summary of selection criteria 
Selection criteria Assessing Relationship to group Response  
Hurdle Board know-how Fixed none 50% 
Role-fit Competency Dynamic Complementary 90% 
Group-fit Compatibility Dynamic Supplementary 80% 
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Table 3: Summary of board processes reviewed 
Participant 
Id. 
Organisational 
sector 
Candidate 
source 
Board 
involvement 
D1 Non Profit Closed High 
D1 Non Profit Closed Low 
D2 Non Profit Open High 
D3 Non Profit Open High 
D3 Non Profit Closed High 
D4 Government Open None 
D4 Government Open None 
D4 Government Closed Low 
D4 Non Profit Open High 
D5 Non Profit Closed Low 
D5 Government Open High 
D5 Public listed Open High 
D5 Non Profit Closed Low 
D6 Public listed Open High 
D6 Public listed Open High 
D6 Public listed Open High 
D7 Non Profit Closed Low 
D7 Non Profit Closed Low 
D7 Non Profit Open High 
D8 Non Profit Closed High 
D9 Non Profit Open High 
D10 Government Open High 
D10 Government Open None 
D10 Government Open None 
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Figure 1a: Data structure map: Selection Criteria  
 
Figure 1b: Data structure map: Selection Process  
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Figure 2: Proposed relationship between selection approach and candidate fit  
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Figure 3: Selection outcome based on selection focus 
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